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CRIME AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
PHILADELPHIA, 1925-1934
ALBERT C. WAGNER2
The relationship between economic conditions and criminality
has long been a subject of interest to criminologists. The literature
is voluminous, though often colored by the particular "mind set"
or economic prejudice peculiar to the individual writer. In some
instances, the same set of statistics has been made to yield conclu-
sions diametrically opposed.
The present study makes no attempt to draw broad generaliza-
tions regarding the relationship between these two sets of phe-
nomena, crime and economic change, but is rather an effort to de-
lineate the effect of a long-continued business depression on the
rates of crime in a restricted locality, namely the city of Philadelphia.
For this purpose, the ten-year period, 1925-1934, was selected
for study. This period possesses the advantage of giving a balance
of a five-year span on either side of the business crisis of November,
1929. In initiating the study, it was intended that the crime indexes
be based on offenses known to the police, but, despite the fact that
the Philadelphia police have been reporting offenses to the Bureau
of Investigation in the Department of Justice, Washington, since
1930, these figures, as well as those for prior periods, were found
to be virtually useless.
3
The index of crime was founded, then, on arrests. Compared
with a rate based on "offenses known," the most serious objection
to be advanced against such an index is- that the number of arrests
in a community does not maintain a constant relationship to actual
crime conditions in that community because of the varied influences
to which it is subjected. To obviate this difficulty, at least in part,
only serious crimes were taken into account, since it is likely that
arrests for such offenses would be relatively more stable than for
2New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, Trenton.
3 The method employed in the computation of these figures varied so radically
during the period as to present a grossly inaccurate and inadequate description
of the true crime situation. It is only for the last eight months of 1933 and for
1934 that the data have approached a complete enumeration, and then only for
larceny over $50 and crimes more serious. The figures for larceny under $50 and
for lesser offenses are still unreliable.
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lesser offenses, simple assaults and disorderly conduct for example.
An attempt was also made to evaluate certain other factors that
tend to vitiate a constant relationship. These influences might be
summarized as follows: (1) changes in arrest policy, (2) changes
in number, selection, and training of police officers, and (3) changes
in police equipment. The third is the most important and three
significant changes must be noted. The Motor Bandit Division was
organized in 1929 "to prevent banditry on the highways." From a
corps of 176 patrolmen mounted on motorcycles the service grew
to a force of 353 during 1934. Police officials are unanimous in the
belief that this patrol has enabled them to make a larger number
of arrests than was previously possible, also, that it has had a de-
cidedly noticeable deterrent effect. The "Red Car" system, an
automobile patrol, was likewise inaugurated in 1929. The cars
were equipped with radio in May, 1931. A larger proportion of
arrests to offenses committed was thus made possible, especially
in the instance of breaking and entering. The teletype system
among district stations was introduced in March, 1930, but with
little effect on arrests, since the same service was previously carried
on by phone communication. A redistricting of the city in 1928
changed the number of station houses from twenty-eight to forty-
three. Whether or not this change resulted in increased efficiency
reflected in the arrest rate it is, however, impossible to say.
Changes in arrest policy come usually as the result of changes
in administrative personnel. There were several such in Philadel-
phia during the period, but no effect on the rate of arrests for serious
crime could be noted in the monthly figures (not here presented).
For the most part, the changes in policy were confined to com-
mercialized vice. This was particularly true of the "shake-up"
which came to national notice late in 1928.
The ranks of the police have continued to be filled from Civil
Service lists. The School of Instruction was discontinued in 1931,
but it is agreed that the effect of this change upon arrests was negli-
gible. The number of police was slightly increased during 1928-
1934 over the preceding period, but the increase hardly took care
of the increase in population. Of greater significance was the re-
organization of the Detective Division in 1929. The force was in-
creased to three times its former size and was more efficiently
organized. This reorganization has undoubtedly raised the rate of
arrests, especially for serious offenses.
All of this has been set down, at the risk of wearying the
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reader, in order better to understand and interpret the crime index
based on arrests which was finally correlated with several indexes
of economic change. The actual figures for arrests were as follows:
Serious Crimes Against Property
Robbery Burglary Larceny* Total
1925 .......................... 667 657 5132 6456
1926 .......................... 712 912 5726 7350
1927 .......................... 723 867 6485 8075
1928 .......................... 902 931 6545 8378
1929 .......................... 736 911' 6652 8299
1930 .......................... 810 1324 7757 9891
1931 .......................... 908 1637 7314 9859
1932 .......................... 746 1694 5857 8297
1933 .......................... 594 1842 4632 7068
1934 .......................... 599 1765 4654 7018
Serious Crimes Against Person
Man- Aggravated
Murder slaughter "  Assault Total
1925 .......................... 104 338 1306 1748
1926 .......................... 178 418 1309 1905
1927 .......................... 165 394 1212 1771
1928 .......................... 189 375 1434 1998
1929 .......................... 224 464 1438 2126
1930 .......................... 220 390 149f 2101
1931 .......................... 152 407 1345 1904
1932 .......................... 186 379 1151 1716
1933 .......................... 124 381 1140 1645
1934 .......................... 75 355 952 1382
From these figures and from the accompanying charts it is seen
that crimes against the person reached their peak in 1929 and 1930.
Except for a diminution in 1927, the increase is slight and steady
up to 1930, and the rate of decrease during and after 1930 slightly
more accelerated than the previous rate of increase in these of-
fenses. The rate is lower in 1934 than in 1925 or in any of the
intervening years.
A period of rapid increase is seen, however, in crimes against
property in 1930, the high point being maintained during 1931.
Moreover, the rate of decrease in offenses of this category is espe-
cially rapid after 1931, down to and including 1933. During 1934
the curve flattens. The rate for burglary is peculiar, showing a
* Contains all larceny, over and under $50, by flimflam, sneak, etc.
**Includes manslaughter by motor vehicle and by trolley.
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highly accelerated and steady increase after 1929 continuing through
1933. "Uniform Crime Reports" show essentially the same situa-
tion for cities over 100,000 population, statistics being based on
offenses known to the police. "Offenses known" for the city of
Minneapolis show the same continuous increase.
4
The economic indexes employed are as follows:
Debits to
Wage Cost Individual
Payments5  of Living6  Retail Trade5  Accounts,
(1923-5=100) (1914=100) (1923-5=100) (1923-5=100)
1925 ............ 101.9 180.1 101.5 108.3
1926 ............ f09.4 181.5 104.7 112.8
1927 ............ 102.7 178.2 100.1 117.4
1928 ............ 98.9 174.9 95.2 132.2
1929 ............ 105.3 174.1 96.6 145.2
1930 ............ 88.6 166.8 89.0 114.4
1931 ............ 69.5 "152.9 76.8 91.5
1932 ............ 50.7 136.3 60.0 61.2
1933 ............ 53.5 134.2 57.0 ....
1934 ............ 68.1 140.5 61.2 68.4
The index of wage payments is based upon reports of. wages from
what is considered by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
as a representative sample of the larger industries within the
Philadelphia area (Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and
Philadelphia counties). The other figures represent the city of
Philadelphia only. The index -of retail trade is based on value of
sales made in about thirty-five of the larger stores of diverse
character.
These indexes exhibit several interesting features. Wage pay-
ments, which have often been 'alleged to bear a direct relationship
to crime, especially crimes against property, show but slight changes
up to and including 1929. After 1929 the decline is rapid down to
1933, when the trend turns upward. As would seem natural, the
decline in savings from 1929 to 1933 presents an almost perfect
correlation with the decline in wages. This correlation does not
hold in the prior period, however.
There is a lag in the decline of living costs as compared with
the decline in wages, which is a phenomenon of universal applica-
tion. Why retail trade should not show a decline in more approxi-
4 "The Amount and Nature of Crime," George B. Vold, American Journal of
Sociology, Volume XL, pp. 796-803.
• Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
6 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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mate ratio to the decrease in wages demands further explanation.
Bias in the computation of these indexes, for comparative purposes,
can be shown, inasmuch as the income groups represented in the
wage payments index are not identical with the income groups
making their purchases in the stores reporting, the latter being
somewhat higher in the scale. This lack of identity does not, how-
ever, completely explain the divergence between the rates. A view
more readily accepted is that relief, from both public and private
sources, has helped maintain the volume of retail trade.
Having set forth the above qualifications to both the index of
crime and the indexes of economic change here presented, what
conclusions are permissible?
First, any general statement regarding the effect of economic
change on the general crime situation during the first five years
of the present depression seems wholly unjustified. Ray Mars Simp-
son, comparing total arrests with an index of employment in Chi-
cago, notes a consistent tendency on the part of arrests to follow the
rise and fall of business during a portion of this period; 7 but such a
correlation possesses little significance in the opinion of the present
writer for two reasons. First, any single index, such as employment,
is an inadequate measure of business conditions; and second, total
arrests are apt to present a wholly inaccurate picture of the crime
situation over a period of time. The majority of arrests in any
city, and most especially in a large city, such as Chicago or Philadel-
phia, comprises arrests for minor offenses, drunkenness, disorderly
conduct, gambling, and the like, which are subject to striking varia-
tions from year to year in police policy. Unless these changes are
critically evaluated, an index based on total arrests can be extremely
misleading. No really significant correlation between the present
depression and crime generally can be shown in the figures for
Philadelphia.
As was said above, only serious crimes were employed in build-
ing the index under discussion in this paper. Likewise, it seemed
feasible to distinguish between crimes against the person and crimes
against property. Though this distinction is open to certain ob-
jections, it is one that has been made by criminologists for many
years. Admittedly, the motives for and the circumstances sur-
rounding each type are different, in some measure at least.
With regard to crimes against the person, it does seem possible
"The Employment Index, Arrests, Court Actions, and Committments in
Illinois," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Volume XXIV, p. 922.
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to say, on the basis of the figures presented, that we are experienc-
ing their diminution coincident with the present depression. For
the 'entire ten-year period the coefficients of correlation between
violent attacks on the person (rape was excluded because of paucity
of arrests) and the various economic indexes are as follows: wage
payments, +.540, cost of living, -.595, retail trade, +.616. Recall-
ing our previous conclusion that the efficiency of the Philadelphia
police has been tremendously enhanced since 1929, it is seen that
these coefficients would be somewhat higher had this increased
efficiency not taken place, i. e., arrests for the depression period
would have been fewer as compared with the prior period, thus
showing more rapid decline in the arrest rate, 1930-1934, more
closely approximating the decline in the economic indexes. In other
words, the true crime situation was probably less serious in the
depression period as compared with 1925-1929 than the number of
arrests shows. The actual correlations are therefore higher than
those give above, and bespeak possible causal relationship.
Regarding crimes against property, generalization is more diffi-
cult. Vold, after examining statistics for prisoners received in state
and federal prisons, offenses known to the police as reported in
"Uniform Crime Reports," and varied other statistics for certain
localities, reaches the conclusion that "none of these indexes show
any sudden increase in crime with the onset of the depression."s
The same could be said of Philadelphia when the figures for crimes
against property and those against the person are combined. And
for the reason that the opposite tendencies in these two types of
offenses cancel each other. As a matter of fact, there is a very
decided and markedly sudden increase in crimes against property
in 1930, and the peak, as before shown, is maintained in 1931. The
necessity for distinguishing between crimes when seeking for causes
is apparent. Likewise, for this purpose at least, a critical view
must be taken of conclusions based on attempts to deal with statistics
on a national scale. A variety of factors is often obscured in such
figures and the easy generalization that the law of large numbers
tends to cancel out bias is not always valid, especially in comparisons
extending over periods of time.
After the sudden increase of crimes against property in 1930
and 1931 the arrest curve for these offenses turns sharply down.
The down trend would be accentuated were we to allow for in-
creased police efficiency which was shown to operate most effectively
s Op. ch., p. 803.
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in the crimes of burglary and robbery. The sudden decrease after
a sharp rise immediately following the onset of hard times might
seem perhaps to lend weight to the notion held by several present-
day writers that relief to needy families, in ameliorating conditions,
tends to decrease offenses against property. But this is to assume
what we might be attempting to show. Even though this relation-
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type through extensive case study, it seems hardly likely to be a
sufficient explanation for the whole of the decline. In all, except
for the sudden increase in crimes against property at the beginning
of the depression the figures cited here furnish small evidence in
favor of the oft-repeated generalization that economic stress in-
creases crimes against property. The coefficients between crimes
against property and the various indexes for the ten-year period
are: wage payments, -. 066, cost of living, -. 003, retail trade,
-+.026.
A trend entirely different from that characterizing offenses
against property in general is seen to obtain in the case of burglary,
when that offense is separately considered. Here there is a sharp,
continuous up-trend for the period 1930-1933, with diminution only
in 1934. The correlations with the indexes of economic change for
the ten-year period are striking: wage payments, -. 940, cost of
living, -. 922, retail trade, -. 955. While it is true that the qualifica-
tion made above to the index of crime based on arrests would
tend to lower this correlation somewhat, the degree of association
is still signifieantly high. There was no "drive" against offenses
of this category during the period, which would tend to raise the
arrest rate for burglary artificially. Moreover, among large cities
the steady increase in the number of burglaries during the era of
depression is a phenomenon of national scope, as was shown above.
It is a phenemenon that has not been adequately explained except
in terms of economic conditions.
In conclusion, it is worthwhile, perhaps, to suggest the desira-
bility of limiting statistical studies of the relationship between crime
and economic conditions to limited areas of application, cities or
other localities where the indexes of both crime and economic con-
ditions can be determined with a fair degree of accuracy, and where
the relationship, if any, between the two sets of phenomena is more
direct. This type of procedure enables the student to make an
evaluation of the various influences bearing upon the indexes em-
ployed, setting the necessary qualifications to the correlations found,
and thus making it possible for him to interpret his results more
adequately.
